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Enlisting Popper in the Case for Scientific
Realism
Jarrett Leplin
University of North Carolina, USA
Résumé : Karl Popper fut un réaliste scientifique malgré lui. Au mépris de
ses propres restrictions concernant les formes de raisonnement scientifique ac-
ceptables et la portée de l’évidence empirique, il insista sur une conception
fortement réaliste des buts et des accomplissements de la science. Dans cet ar-
ticle, je construis une défense générale du réalisme scientifique, m’appuyant, au
fil des développements, sur celles des positions popperiennes qui font progresser
l’argument, et critiquant celles qui l’entravent. Bien que la ligne argumentative
d’ensemble soit mienne, je montre, par des attributions directes, que Popper
partage mes conclusions réalistes, et pourquoi il les partage.
Abstract: Karl Popper was a scientific realist in spite of himself. In defiance
of his own restrictions on acceptable forms of scientific reasoning and the
reach of empirical evidence, he insisted on a strongly realist conception of the
goals and achievements of science. In this article I mount a general defense of
scientific realism, taking advantage, as I proceed, of those Popperian positions
that advance the argument, and criticizing those that impede it. While the
overall line of argumentation is my own, I show, through direct attributions,
that and why Popper shares my realist conclusions.
1 The Burden of Argument
Theoretical entities are the unobservable entities that scientific theories
posit to explain or predict empirical results. Inaccessible to experience,
their claim to conviction derives from the acceptability of the theories
in which they figure. Electrons, fields, and genes are examples normally
thought to be real entities. Phlogiston and the electromagnetic ether,
though once confidently embraced, have turned out not to be real. The
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fate of the strings and gravitons advanced by theories at the frontiers
of physics is unresolved. The ontological status of theoretical entities
is frequently uncertain, disputed, revised. The existence of such an en-
tity may be denied because, with changes in theory, something different,
with a related explanatory role, is thought to exist instead. Thus oxy-
gen replaces phlogiston in the chemical theory of combustion. Or an
entity may be rejected because a new theory denies it any continuing
explanatory utility. The crystalline spheres of ancient and early mod-
ern astronomy are simply obviated by Newtonian gravity. In general,
the question within science is not whether theoretical entities exist but
which theoretical entities exist. Answers to this question change with
the fortunes of theory.
Scientific realism is the position that this question can be answered
on evidentially probative grounds. Many posited entities turn out not
to exist and the status of many others remains unsettled. But in some
cases science develops, through the testing and application of its theo-
ries, adequate reason to believe that certain theoretical entities are real.
Further, according to scientific realism, the success of theories warrants
some beliefs about the nature—the properties and behavior—of these
entities. For, as they are unobservable, the mere assertion of their ex-
istence, without an account of their nature, is insufficient to serve their
explanatory and predictive purposes. All such realist beliefs are defea-
sible; new evidence could undermine them, as new evidence frequently
forces changes in theory. Nevertheless, according to scientific realism,
such beliefs are epistemically justifiable.
Thus understood, scientific realism was certainly Popper’s position.
Of course, Popper denied that theories can be verified. But he held that
they can be falsified, and in some cases it is difficult to distinguish a
falsification that establishes the equally theoretical contrary of what is
falsified from verification. For example, according to Popper, Einstein’s
analysis of Brownian motion refuted Mach and Ostwald’s denial of the
reality of atoms. Popper thinks that science established the reality of
atoms by falsifying the theory that there are no atoms. Now, it is surely
questionable whether the law governing the motions of Brownian parti-
cles that Einstein derived from atomic theory is properly portrayed as
a refutation of Mach’s skepticism regarding atoms. But it is clear that
Popper’s own view of the matter is realist. The resources he grants to
science for refutation provide all the verification the realist could ask for
in this case.
Nor is this an isolated case in Popper’s thinking. He holds in general
that in refuting theories science proves that other theories represent the
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world more accurately, that they give a truer account of the nature of an
objective, independent reality. And he thinks that the theoretical entities
that successor theories posit to explain observable phenomena are real,
as atoms are real. Thus, for Popper, special relativity is truer than
Newtons’s theory, and general relativity is truer that special relativity.
Now, of course the sense of these truth comparisons is not captured
by Popper’s analysis of verisimilitude. So much the worse, according to
Popper himself, for this analysis. He writes,
“To describe a theory as better than another, or superior,
or what not, is, I hold, to indicate that it appears to come
nearer to the truth. Truth—absolute truth—remains our
aim.” [Popper 1982, 57]
Appearances may deceive and aims may be unreachable. But Pop-
per’s realism is uncompromised by any recourse to such caveats. Here
are other quotations:
“[our procedures succeed] in the sense that our conjectural
theories tend progressively to come nearer to the truth; that
is, to true descriptions of certain facts, or aspects of reality.”
[Popper 1972, 40]
“If two competing theories have been criticized—and one
has stood up better—then we have reason to believe that it
is closer to the truth.” [Popper 1982, 58]
Popper follows this statement by abandoning his official definition of
verisimilitude, not because it has been shown to be defective, which, as
he acknowledges, is grounded enough, but instead because it does not
capture the realist sense of proximity to truth intended in these passages.
Popper did not limit our epistemic capacity to get closer to truth
to scientific comparisons. Even an irrefutable metaphysical theory can
be supported (“argued for”, with the result “overwhelmingly in its favor”
[Popper 1972, 38]) by arguing against its competition. Thus, meta-
physical realism defeats idealism. Popper believes that induction is un-
necessary, not because we don’t need its conclusions, but because the
conclusions we do need can be sustained deductively.
Antirealism claims, as a matter of philosophical principle, that there
can never be adequate reason to invest credence beyond the range of
the observable. Antirealism regards all theoretical entities, regardless
of the ontological status assigned to them within science—regardless of
the available evidence—as conceptual tools whose roles are pragmatic,
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not epistemic1. Antirealism need not deny the reality of unobservable
entities; it denies that their reality is ever warrantedly assertable by us.
Antirealism proclaims a sweeping agnosticism with respect to theory, in-
dependently of the evidence used to evaluate theories. Scientific evidence
attests not to the truth of theories nor to the existence of the unobserv-
able entities they posit, but only to their explanatory and predictive
utility.
So the antirealist’s goal for science is purely pragmatic; theories are
not, even potentially, vehicles for extending knowledge of inaccessible
potions of nature. Popper says that the goal of science is testable expla-
nations, which sounds consonant with pragmatism. It is about objective
and independent reality that Popper wants testable explanations. This
makes him a metaphysical realist, which does not yet distinguish him
from the antirealist about science. But Popper adds that it would make
no sense to seek testable explanations of an independent reality unless
that reality is potentially discoverable. In strongly moralistic terms, he
describes the quest to get “nearer to the truth about the world” as “a
challenge to our intellectual ingenuity, courage, integrity” [Popper 1982,
81]. This not antirealism about science. For antirealism, the only ap-
propriate intellectual ambitions are pragmatic; for Popper, they are also
metaphysical2.
If the dispute between realism and antirealism is a dispute between
science and philosophy, antirealism loses. There is no a priori stance
from which philosophy can presume to dictate the standards and meth-
ods for acquiring knowledge. Popper contended that his own method-
ology for science was a priori; he called falsificationism ‘normative’ and
‘metaphysical’ rather than ‘empirical’. But he did this because he was
pressed. Interpreted as an empirical theory of science, falsificationism is
clearly falsified. His recourse to the a priori does Popper no credit. It is
methodologically illegitimate in exactly the way that Popper argued it
to be methodologically illegitimate for scientists to take advantage of the
logical indecisiveness of falsification—the fact that “any theory whatever
1So defined, antirealism subdivides into a number of more specialized positions.
Among the antirealist positions that Popper and I oppose are Larry Laudan’s [Laudan
1990] pragmatism, Bas van Fraassen’s [van Fraassen 1980] “constructive empiricism”,
and Arthur Fine’s [Fine 1986] “natural ontological attitude”.
2Compare the moralistic stances of antirealists Laudan, Fine, and van Fraassen.
Laudan ridicules talk of getting closer to truth as irresponsible “mumbo jumbo” [Lep-
lin, 1984, 230]. Fine thinks that what realism adds to the “natural ontological atti-
tude” is empty posturing, of “no more force than an arresting foot thump” [Leplin,
1984, 97]. Van Fraassen [van Fraassen 1980] accuses the realist of the moral failing
of false conscience. What Popper lauds as intellectual integrity, these antirealists
deplore as intellectual pretense.
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can be immunized from refutation” [Popper 1972, 38]—to protect their
theories from conflict with experience. Doing this defeats the asymme-
try between verification and falsification on which Popper’s methodology
depends.
Recourse to the a priori is not an option. How knowledge is best ac-
quired depends on the nature of the objects of knowledge, on what the
world is like, and is therefore itself knowledge to be acquired, in the way
that any empirical knowledge is acquired, through scientific investigation
of the world. Abstract reasoning, conceptual or linguistic analysis, ap-
peal to common sense or intuition—any distinctively philosophical mode
of inquiry—are notoriously unreliable as a determinant of the nature or
scope of scientific knowledge. Nor does autonomous philosophy deliver a
consistent verdict to compare with the conclusions that science reaches.
No settled, dependable method of appraisal, such as operates within the
natural sciences, is available to adjudicate among the indefinitely many
competing positions that philosophers fashion.
Some realists have contended that their dispute with antirealism
could be won on just this basis. Realism sides with science; compar-
ing the progress of science with the state of philosophical inquiry, the
attraction of siding with science is an advantage that no philosophically
generated antirealism can overcome. This is essentially what realists are
saying when they claim that but for their position science is mysteri-
ous, its successfulness an unprojectable accident. To reject realism, they
suggest, is to reject science itself3. Science’s detractors gleefully agree.
They think they can infer from their rejection of realism that the success
and progressiveness of science are illusory, that its epistemic status is no
better than that of any other social institution or practice.
Unfortunately, however, the resolution of the dispute over realism
does not reduce to one’s attitude toward science. Essentially, this is
because science and philosophy are not autonomous. Philosophical as-
sumptions are ineliminable from the reasoning by which science fixes its
ontological commitments. And substantive scientific results often sup-
port philosophical limitations on science. It is open to the antirealist to
contend that realist beliefs cannot be read off the record of what science
achieves, but must be read in via a certain optional, philosophical inter-
pretation. Science can, or even does, operate just as well without such
beliefs4.
3Hilary Putnam [Putnam 1978, lecture 2] best represents this attitude. He says
that realism is “science’s philosophy”.
4According to Fine [Fine 1986], science operates demonstrably better without
realist commitments.
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For example, science operates just as well with a system of funda-
mental equations that admit of no coherent physical interpretation as it
does with conceptually tractable laws, for no physical commitments at
the theoretical level follow in any case. From a (consistent) antirealist
perspective, the quest for an understandable interpretation of quantum
mechanics is misdirected. The antirealist therefore disagrees with theo-
retical physicists as to the importance of interpreting quantum mechan-
ics, even as he insists that his philosophy is consonant with scientific
practice.
But this rejection of realism’s scientific pedigree concedes that the
priority of science would favor a philosophical position that science re-
ally did require. And this concession places the argumentative burden
on antirealism. Science claims to discover and to learn the nature of
certain theoretical entities. That science contrasts entities found to be
real from those that merely seemed to be shows that realism is essential
to science, in exactly the way that Popper contrasted appearances from
reality to argue that metaphysical realism is essential to common sense
(1972, 37). ‘Electron’, for example, is a purportedly referential term,
and properties of electrons—mass, charge, spin—are held to be well es-
tablished. According to antirealism, all claims to discover or learn such
things, all contrasts among purported theoretical entities as to which are
real and which fictive, are mistaken. Given the priority to which science
is entitled, the opening move in the debate should be to argue that its
characteristic theoretical hypotheses cannot be warranted.
According, I elect to begin with antirealist arguments. In subsequent
sections, I shall consider two significant challenges to realism. Although
unsuccessful, they may be judged sufficiently compelling to shift the
burden of argument back upon the realist. Therefore, I shall follow with
development of an independent argument for realism. In summary, I
contend that realism is the default position, and that the case to be
made for switching to antirealism is at best indecisive. At the same
time, a compelling defense of realism is available. I will further show
that Popper, despite his opposition to inductive inference, agrees with
me.
2 Underdetermination
A major source of antirealist argumentation is the simple, incontestable
fact that observational evidence is logically inconclusive with respect to
the truth of theory. That is, the falsity of any theory T is logically
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consistent with the truth of all observation statements Oi used in assess-
ing T . T is, in this respect, underdetermined by the evidence; indeed,
by all possible evidence. It follows that in affirming T on the basis of
evidence, one must reason ampliatively; one must use forms of reason-
ing that are not truth-preserving. One must, in defiance of Popper, be
an inductivist. Eliminative induction, a kind of process of elimination
in which the range of potential contending hypotheses is unrestricted,
is such a form of reasoning, as is inductive generalization. Another is
abduction, in which the explanatory power of a hypothesis counts as
evidence for its truth. In practice, scientific argumentation exhibits all
the rationally cogent ampliative forms that philosophers have identified,
although Popper thought that it doesn’t need them.
But this reliance on ampliative reasoning is not immediately an ob-
jection to affirming theories. For such reasoning is endemic to, and
ineliminable from, ordinary inference that grounds common-sense be-
liefs about the observable world. Without it, one could not ground even
the belief that a plainly observable object continues to exist when unob-
served. This belief is certainly abductive. Without ampliation, one gets
not antirealism about science but a sweeping skepticism—a metaphysi-
cal antirealism—that no party to the dispute over realism, certainly not
Popper, accepts.
Popper notwithstanding, the question for realism, therefore, is whe-
ther, allowing the rational cogency of standard forms of ampliative in-
ference, theories are still underdetermined. It is usual to formulate this
thesis of ampliative underdetermination, the only kind worth consider-
ing, by asserting the existence of rival theories to T that are equally well
supported by the evidence. It is then said that theory-choice is under-
determined: a preference for any theory over its rivals must have some
nonevidential, pragmatic basis.
Is ampliative underdetermination credible? Notice that the usual
formulation of this thesis is not its minimal formulation. Minimally, the
claim is that no body of observational evidence {Oi} warrants any theory
T ; neither truth-preserving inference nor rational modes of ampliative
inference can get you from {Oi} to T . The existence of evidentially
equivalent rival theories is a further assertion. It is easy to see why this
further assertion is made. Without it, there is no particular reason to
suppose, quite generally and abstractly, that T is not rationally reach-
able. Embedded into the very formulation of underdetermination, then,
is an argument for it: there will always be alternative theoretical options
that fare as well on the evidence as T does.
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But now we discern a serious equivocation. Once the legitimacy of
ampliation is conceded, the existence of the evidentially equivalent rivals
can have no logical or otherwise a priori guarantee. For the sort of rivals
to T whose existence the logical gap between {Oi} and T guarantees
are surely not defensible by ampliation. For example, the construction
∼ T&
∏
{Oi} (
∏
denoting conjunction), while both inconsistent with T
(and to that extent a “rival”) and consistent with the evidence for T , is
certainly not supported by this evidence. While the Oi might fall short
in warranting T—this is the possibility that undertermination declares
realized invariably—the Oi can hardly be supposed to warrant ∼ T . The
situation at issue is not one in which T faces counterevidence or discon-
firmation, but one in which the evidence bearing on T is allowed to be as
supportive as one likes; the claim is that even then T is underdetermined
because some rival is supported equally well. ∼ T&
∏
{Oi}, is merely
logically consistent with the evidence; it is not supported at all. What
would support ∼ T is the negation of some Oi. Thus an immediate
reason to declare ∼ T&
∏
{Oi} unconfirmable is that confirmation of its
first component requires refutation of the second.
This argument assumes that if the Oi support ∼ T&
∏
{Oi} then
they support ∼ T . What makes this assumption reasonable is not some
holistic conception of confirmation according to which any evidence for
a theory supports equally, or even to any extent, all distinguishable
components of the theory or all consequences of the theory. Such holism
is implausible on its face and proves detrimental to realism. Rather, the
assumption is reasonable because, in the particular situation depicted,
∼ T is the only bit of theory around to be the object of support. The
Oi are suppliers of support, not objects of it. It makes little sense to
speak of a relation of support between {Oi} and itself. It could only be
in virtue of supporting ∼ T that the Oi support ∼ T&
∏
{Oi}, as they
have been hypothesized to do.
Of course ∼ T&
∏
{Oi} makes empirical commitments and is truth-
valuable. Why isn’t this enough to make it confirmable? Although the
Oi are not self-supporting, are they not confirmed by the facts? That is,
do not the observations reported, as opposed to the observation sentences
that report them, confirm ∼ T&
∏
{Oi}?
The answer must be negative. We are not concerned with choices
among rival theories that the evidence refutes. The underdetermination
thesis applies to theories that the evidence supports; it is these that are
supposed to have equally supported rivals. Therefore, the Oi must either
be supposed true or supposed to instantiate generalizations of supposed
truths if the supposed rival committed to them is even to be formulated.
Enlisting Popper in the Case for Scientific Realism 79
And a theory is not confirmed by an observation presupposed in its very
formulation. Observational results obtainable from a theory only by
defining the theory to include them do not support the theory. For it
is not even logically possible for the theory to get them wrong, whereas
a result can support a theory only if it is unlikely to be obtained if the
theory is false.
Accordingly, ∼ T&
∏
{Oi} is not confirmed by {Oi}. The only
possible epistemic route to ∼ T&
∏
{Oi} is indirect, via some further
theory inconsistent with T that delivers all of T ′s observational conse-
quences. But this further theory cannot be generated algorithmically, as
∼ T&
∏
{Oi} was generated, by operating on T . Not even the existence
of such a theory, let alone its confirmability, has any a priori guarantee.
Strictly speaking, of course, the antirealist’s claim is not that the Oi
confirm ∼ T&
∏
{Oi}, but only that they support ∼ T&
∏
{Oi} as well
as they do T , that T and its rival are equally confirmed by the evidence.
This common amount of confirmation cannot, however, be zero without
repudiating ampliation. More generally, it is a reasonable constraint on
the theories that the thesis of underdetermination invokes as rivals that
these theories be at least amenable to evidential support. A proposi-
tional structure that could not in principle be confirmed violates this
constraint. Such a structure, crafted solely for logical consistency with
the observational consequences of an existing theory, will not be enter-
tained as an alternative to the existing theory because there is nothing
to be done with it; it is rightly dismissed as dead-in-the-water because its
only possible support is derivative from some further, independent theory
that would itself be the proper object of confirmation. Once theories are
required to be defensible by ampliation, conditions like confirmability in
principle, explanatory power, and generality—conditions that standard
forms of ampliative inference select for—become reasonable constraints
on theoretic status.
Now, of course, this line of argument is unavailable to Popper. From
the perspective of Popper’s methodology, the failure of algorithmically
generated rivals to a theory to be confirmable is but an instance of the
failure of any theory to be confirmable. Yet Popper’s realism requires
him to find some way to dismiss these rivals. If ∼ T&
∏
{Oi} rather
than T is the way of the world, then the Popperian goal for science is
in principle elusive. No conceivable exercise of the intellectual virtues
Popper champions could get us anywhere. So what can Popper do about
∼ T&
∏
{Oi}? It does no good to fault it in comparison with T as to
falsifiability. Both are falsifiable, and by the same results. The solution
has to be a difference in confirmability.
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Popper, the realist, must find this situation acutely embarrassing.
The entire underdeterminist strategy of antirealism is deeply Popperian
in spirit. If there is no confirmation, all it takes to nullify the effect of
evidence is to arrange for a rival to T that fares alike as to falsifiability.
Then all theory-preference is baseless. Popper’s methodology has been
used to preempt his epistemology. What is he to do?
His proposal is to disqualify theories that introduce unexplained de-
pendencies5. It is not clear that ∼ T&
∏
{Oi} does introduce unex-
plained dependencies. But the real problem is that unexplained depen-
dencies may be perfectly testable and therefore admissible by Popperian
standards. Popper’s idea may be better applied to other candidates for
T ′s rivals. Let T ′ affirm that T holds whenever observations are made
but not otherwise, the universe instantaneously reverting, when obser-
vations recommence, to the conditions that, according to T , would have
then prevailed had observation been continuous. T ′ exhibits an unex-
plained dependency on observation. But unfortunately, so does T . Let
us define
T1: T holds when observations are made and T
′ holds at other times.
T2: T
′ holds when observations are made and T holds at other times.
T
⋆: T1 holds of everything being observed and T2 holds of everything
not being unobserved.
Then whatever obeys T ⋆ obeys T and conversely. Evidently, T ≡ T ⋆.
But T ⋆ introduces unexplained dependencies. In short, whether or not
a theory introduces unexplained dependencies appears language depen-
dent. Pending a better criterion of what constitutes an unexplained
dependency, it is unclear how they are supposed to adjudicate among
observationally equivalent theoretical rivals.
Surely the correct objection to a construction like T ′, although un-
available to Popper, is just that it is unconfirmable. It has a confirmable
component, but not only do confirmations of this component not con-
firm the other component; nothing could confirm the other component.
So again, it does not take holism to rule T ′ unconfirmable. But if T ′
is unconfirmable, it cannot be equally well supported as T , which is
confirmable. Of course, T , as much as T ′, carries a commitment to con-
ditions that prevail in the absence of observation. But T ′s commitment,
unlike T ′′s, is ampliatively defensible; stability is a paradigm of ordinary,
5I think that Popper intends the proposal as a response to Nelson Goodman’s
[Goodman 1965] “new riddle of induction”.
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unproblematic ampliation. Moreover, the component T # common to T
and T ′, which says that T holds during observation, is confirmable and
exempt from the underdetermination that T ′ is supposed to create. T ′
offers no rival to T #.
The equivocation of the underdetermination thesis, then, is this:
while only the ampliative form of underdetermination challenges realism,
it is the merely logical form of underdetermination that supplies the ri-
val theories invoked to establish the underdetermination thesis. For the
challenge to get off the ground, there will have to be some substantive,
independent basis for supposing the rivals to exist at all.
What could this be? There are examples of theoretical rivalries that
resist adjudication, but they do so for reasons that presuppose a sub-
stantial body of theory that further evidence could undermine. Thus,
the possibility of an epistemically principled choice cannot be precluded.
Within Newtonian theory, rival attributions of motion to the center of
mass of the universe are unadjudicable, but Newtonian theory could
prove wrong about the detectability of absolute motion. Any theory that
both fixes one of its parameters and declares it unmeasurable, or defines
a parameter but leaves it unspecified, generates rivals. But these rivals
share the theory’s fallible ontological and nomological commitments.
Even if such examples were compelling, argument by example is un-
likely to motivate a perfectly general thesis about all theories and all
possible bodies of evidence. Moreover, there are plenty of examples that
point the other way, cases in which scientists are unable to produce even
a single theory that makes sense of the mystifying empirical regulari-
ties their experiments have revealed. There are many such anomalies in
astronomy, such as the motion of stars at the periphery of our galaxy,
which is greater than known gravitational forces allow, and the “great
chain” of galaxies, which violates the large-scale uniformity required by
big-bang cosmology. Far from unavoidable, a multiplicity of theoretical
options may not even be the norm.
I conclude that any challenge to realism from underdetermination is
vastly underdetermined.
3 Superseded Science
Lots of successful theories turn out to be wrong; the entities they posit,
nonexistent. Why is currently successful science any more entitled to
credence than the once successful science we now reject? Does the history
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of theorizing not provide ample reason to distrust theories, regardless of
the evidence that supports them?
This skeptical argument sounds Popperian. Despite his strongly pro-
gressive reading of history, Popper repeatedly denies that successfully
passing tests—“corroboration”—can elevate a theory’s epistemic stand-
ing over its refuted rivals. A highly corroborated theory is no more likely
to pass a test than a refuted theory. He writes:
“I do not assume, that a something (whether animal or theory) that
has shown its fitness to survive tests by surviving them has shown its
fitness to survive any future test . . . degree of corroboration is nothing
but an evaluation of past performance.” [Popper 1982, 64]
Evidently fitness is not an attestable property of anything; only hav-
ing been fit is attestable. So the fact that a theory has been successful
does not privilege it. Of course, the argument against present science is
an historical induction, and Popper disallows induction. But in so do-
ing he grants the argument its skeptical conclusion. The realist Popper
needs a way out.
The obvious way, unavailable to Popper, is that past theories ulti-
mately proved unsuccessful whereas current theories have not. This is
why their temporal status differs. But with further testing and further
theoretical developments, might current theories not prove unacceptable,
just as their temporarily accepted predecessors did? Indeed they might;
realism admits the defeasibility of all theory. The question is whether
there is reason to forecast this development. The major fundamental the-
ories of current physics —general relativity, the basic laws of quantum
mechanics, the standard model of elementary particles— are certainly
the most severely tested theories ever, and they have proved flawless
to a precision uncontemplated in the assessment of their predecessors.
These theories are not thought to be the final word; their very multi-
plicity reflects limitations that a more fundamental, unifying theory will
overcome. But there is no reason to expect a unifying theory to require
their rejection. Why should the fact that earlier theories failed count
against the different, better-tested theories we have now?
The issue here is the status of second-order evidence. The challenge
to realism is that our methods of developing and evaluating theories,
our standards for investing credence, are demonstrably unreliable. They
have led us to judge Newtonian gravity, phlogistic chemistry, the electro-
magnetic ether to be firmly established, as well confirmed as a theoretical
commitment could be expected to be. In the 19th century, Maxwell fa-
mously considered the ether the best-confirmed theoretical entity in nat-
ural philosophy. Lavoisier [Lavoisier 1965, volume 1 section 2] declared
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the material theory of heat to be no longer a hypothesis, but a truth.
The phenomena of heat, wrote Lavoisier [Lavoisier 1965, volume 1, sec-
tion 3], are inconceivable without “admitting that they are the result of
a real, material substance, of a very subtile fluid, that insinuates itself
throughout the molecules of all bodies and pushes them apart”. Chas-
tened by such misjudgments, we distrust the methods that licensed them.
Distrusting our methods, we distrust the theories they now recommend,
however much these theories excel under them. First-order evidence sup-
ports current theory, but there is second-order evidence against reliance
on first-order evidence. The priority of second-order evidence challenges
realism.
But why is second-order evidence privileged? As there could be no
second-order evidence without first-order evidence to learn from, the
relation would appear symmetric. We cannot very well infer from the
conclusions to which first-order evidence leads that the conclusions to
which it leads are untrustworthy, for if they are untrustworthy then they
are no basis for inference. Yet the trustworthiness of conclusions we
draw from first-order evidence depends on the evidential warrant of the
standards of evidence and modes of inference used in drawing them. If
the trustworthiness of each level of evidence is presupposed in assessing
that of the other, neither is privileged.
Giving priority to second-order evidence raises quite general problems
in epistemology. Not only do theories prove wrong; ordinary, paradig-
matically justified beliefs that ampliative reasoning must be allowed to
license prove wrong. That systems of ordinary beliefs have proven to
contain errors is second-order evidence for the erroneousness of current
belief systems, none of whose component beliefs is currently individually
impeachable. Am I to induce, from my record of fallibility, that some of
my present beliefs are false, although the evidence favors each of them
and I have no grounds to doubt any? If so, I am lodged in paradox.
For in addition to believing that some of my beliefs are false, I am enti-
tled to believe that all of them are true by the principle that epistemic
justification is closed under conjunction. If each of these propositions
is justified, so, by further application of this closure principle, is their
self-contradictory conjunction, which is absurd.
Partly for this reason, the closure principle for justification under
conjunction is disputed within epistemology. But an antirealism that
purports to rationalize scientific practice cannot afford to dispute it.
Without this principle, rational inference does not in general transmit
epistemic warrant. For in general it is only in conjunction, not individ-
ually, that premises provide a basis for inference. And science grows as
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much by forging new inferential connections—by relating new ideas to
what is already known—as by introducing new theories, hypotheses, em-
pirical laws, and experimental results. Inference, often without prospect
of independent empirical confirmation, is a frequent basis for extensions
of science.
The presumption that second-order evidence trumps first-order ev-
idence gives too simple a picture. Methods of evaluation depend on
substantive developments in theory. What we expect of theories re-
sponds to what our best theories achieve. As current theories are more
severely tested, current methods may reasonably be supposed more re-
liable. As our knowledge of the world improves, so does our knowledge
of how such knowledge is obtained. It might be difficult to prove that
methods improve, without assuming, impermissibly, the superiority of
current theories. But the burden of argument here is squarely on the
antirealist. A challenge mounted from history is not entitled to pre-
suppose that methods are stable. Unless the antirealist can show that
rejected theories were once warranted by the highest standards that the
best current theories meet, the challenge fails.
It is also unclear that the failures of past theories are epistemic fail-
ures. Not only do we learn from our mistakes; it is an epistemic advance
to learn that we have been mistaken. This is certainly Popper’s posi-
tion. That a posited theoretical entity does not, after all, exist, or that
a posited theoretical mechanism is not responsible for a certain effect,
is important theoretical information. According to Popper, it can even
show us what does exist instead. So it is not clear that a consistent
antirealism can allow for this information. What makes it any more
trustworthy than the information, equally a conclusion from first-order
evidence, that a theoretical entity does exist? The indispensability of
auxiliary hypotheses in generating observable predictions from theories
belies the apparent logical asymmetry between verification and falsifica-
tion. If empirical evidence cannot establish theories, neither can it refute
them. For the refutation of a theory requires that theoretical auxiliaries
assumed in testing it be independently established.
Popper was quite clear about this. He says repeatedly in [Popper
1982] that an element of free choice and of decision is always involved
in accepting a refutation, or in attributing it to one hypothesis rather
than another. Because he held that theoretical auxiliaries cannot be
established, he was able to uphold an asymmetry of verification and fal-
sification only as a matter of methodological edict. As a formal relation
between a theory and an observation statement, the relation that con-
stitutes Popper’s criterion for demarcating science, falsification amounts
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to nothing. For he held that observation statements are as falsifiable
as theories, and that all observation carries theoretical presuppositions:
“We cannot prevent our theories from influencing our observations” [Pop-
per 1982, 48]. Any asymmetry between verification and confirmation is
but a matter of policy, and Popper lacks the resources to recommend his
policy over another. This is why he frequently describes the status of
protocol sentences as “conventional”.
As much as we see once successful theories rejected, we see once un-
successful theories resurrected. Why is the antirealist more impressed by
the fall of an admired theory than by the rise of one scorned? Heliocen-
trism, the vision of ancient Greek astronomers eclipsed by Aristotle, and
the checkered history of Prout’s hypothesis are as compelling examples
as phlogiston and nested spheres. Yet the correctness of the information
that a posited theoretical entity does not exist after all is presupposed
in pronouncing past theories wrong. There is a certain commitment to
the correctness of current theory in impugning past theoretical commit-
ments, for it is current theory that corrects them. Yet the antirealist
impugns past theory so as to induce that current theory is unfounded.
It would seem more reasonable to regard the record of theory change
as constructive, as Popper did in spite of himself. In being rejected,
theories are improved upon. Because science has been able to identify
its mistakes and rectify them, its current commitments are all the more
trustworthy.
4 Selective Confirmation
What are these commitments? What, for that matter, are the commit-
ments of any successful theory? I have argued that because the onto-
logical status of theoretical posits is inconstant and disputatious within
science, a philosophy that imposes uniformity assumes the burden of
dissenting from science. But if the status of theoretical entities is dis-
putatious, what is one to be realist about? In particular, are the once
successful posits, from whose eventual rejection the antirealist induces
the epistemic unreliability of current science, ones to which a realist
should have been committed in the first place?
Success has many forms. Not only is scientific appraisal unstable; it
is multidimensional. Theories and the entities they posit are assessed for
their utility, heuristic power, explanatory value, mathematical tractabil-
ity, experimental manipulability, cohesion with background knowledge.
Epistemic justification is neither the only, nor necessarily the most press-
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ing, concern. Because of this complexity, the epistemic commitments of
science cannot simply be read off of scientific practice. Whether or not
the failures of past science are failures of a realist view of that science
depends upon realism’s criterion for deciding what theoretical posits to
treat realistically. Deference to scientific practice is not a definitive cri-
terion.
This problem is intractable so long as one takes a holistic view of con-
firmation. All manner of theoretical posits whose roles in a successful
theory are not such as to accrue epistemic warrant then go along for the
ride. Is the space-time interval in Minkowski’s interpretation of special
relativity supposed to be a real entity, to whose existence the empirical
evidence for relativity attests, or is it but a mathematical invariance of
dispensable convenience? Are quarks a purely formal method of clas-
sification for hadrons, or are they their physical constituents? Is the
mechanical ether an intuitive aid to picturing what is going in the space
between the locations of charged bodies, or is it an entity that needs to
exist if Maxwell’s equations are to be true?
To treat the empirical success of a theory as confirmation of the
theory as a whole is to obviate such questions; it is then the theory as
such that evidence confirms, not this hypothesis or this theoretical posit
over others. The loss in discrimination may appear innocuous from an
overview of scientific practice, because the pragmatic goals of prediction
and control are as well advanced by an entity’s conceptual utility as by
its existence. But the questions are pressing for the realist, who must
discriminate entities whose existence is established by the evidence from
those that can come or go with impunity.
To do this, the realist must adopt some criterion beyond mere partic-
ipation in an empirically successful theory to identify theoretical posits
to be treated realistically. There are both positive and negative criteria,
and some of them are intuitively obvious in the abstract, if problematic
in application. For example, a theoretical posit gets no epistemic support
from the successful prediction of a result that it was artificially contrived
to yield. Nor is it supported by a result that the theory predicts inde-
pendently, a result the theory does not need it to obtain. The positive
criterion would seem to be that the posit be used essentially in achiev-
ing the theory’s empirical success, and that this success be unexplainable
without it.
It may have been inconceivable to Maxwell that electrical phenom-
ena could proceed without a mechanical medium to propagate electro-
magnetic waves. But his equations alone, without the ether hypothesis,
generate the predictive success of his theory. Newton believed that the
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apparent motions, which his laws of mechanics governed, presupposed
the existence of absolute frames of space and time. But these posits
have no role in the use of Newton’s laws to generate observable predic-
tions. The igneous fluid that Lavoisier thought was necessary to push
the molecules of a heated substance apart was not required to account
for the phenomena of heat; molecular motion itself was the operative
mechanism.
A pattern is evident in such examples. Like the hidden variables of
intuitively picturable interpretations of quantum mechanics, an entity or
structure is introduced to make physical sense of the laws used to predict
empirical phenomena. But the particular properties attributed to this
entity do not matter to the use of these laws in successful prediction.
The center of mass of the universe is supposed, by Newton, to be at
rest in absolute space, but it makes no difference to the use of Newton’s
laws to give it a positive constant absolute velocity. Maxwell thought
there had to be some sort of ether to propagate waves, but he was free
to give it all sorts of mechanical properties without affecting his laws.
Lavoisier was vague by default as to the physical process by which his
igneous fluid flowed. Entities like phlogiston or the nested spheres of a
geocentric universe are rejected because they give the wrong theoretical
mechanism. They have identifiable successors in later theories—oxygen
and gravity. In contrast, presuppositional posits in the conceptual back-
ground of successful laws may be rejected simply because their existence
proves inconsistent which subsequent theory. They have no successors
because there is no predictive role to continue to fill. We teach ourselves
to regard them as metaphysically superfluous.
Thus, conceptual involvement, however fundamental, in a successful
theory is not sufficient for the reality of a theoretical entity. What sci-
entists believe the world must be like and how they make sense of the
empirical phenomena owe too much to heuristic concepts that under-
lie their theory and to the entanglement of pragmatic among epistemic
ends. Rather, the criterion must be that the theory owes its success to
this entity. With this criterion, the realist can reject historical coun-
terexamples of successful but nonexistent theoretical entities, and argue
that entities meeting his criterion survive in current science.
5 An Argument from Novelty
Despite their inconclusiveness, the challenges to realism have pressured
realists into independent lines of argumentation. For antirealism has
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its own pedigree. It is embedded within a long-ascendant tradition of
empiricist epistemology, and from the perspective of this tradition real-
ism’s epistemic commitments are excessive. Empiricism is certainly the
philosophical root of antirealism’s indiscriminate suspicion of theoretical
entities. If experience is the only possible source of knowledge of the
world, beliefs as to the existence and nature of unobservable entities are
inherently suspect and require a special defense. The predominant line
of defense is explanationist: If theories owe their empirical success to
unobservable entities, then we need realism to explain why theories are
empirically successful. If there is no truth to theory, if theoretical enti-
ties are not real, then the predictive accuracy of theory is a coincidence
too cosmic to accept.
There is good precedent in Popper for this line of thought. Science
seeks explanations, and “if it is the aim of science to explain, then it will
also be its aim to explain what so far has been accepted as an explican,
such as a law of nature.” [Popper 1982] I take it this means that the goal
is to explain, not the sociological phenomenon that something is taken
to be a law of nature, but rather the fact that the natural world works in
compliance with this law. That is, we need to explain the second-order
fact about our theories that they are empirically successful. In Popper’s
terms, we need to learn what it is about a theory that enables it to pass
tests that others fail, tests that are, by design, as hard to pass as we
can make them. Popper will not allow this question to go unanswered.
When, despite its success, a theory is replaced, we look to its successor
for an explanation of its success. It was Karl Popper, not Hilary Putnam
or Richard Boyd, who first derided the failure to do so as acquiescence
in the miraculous:
“Simply to submit to the fact that the change has happened—
a theory has been rejected but we have no explanation of its
success—would amount to the acceptance of miracles and to
the abandonment of rational explanation.” [Popper 1982, 57]
Popper’s answer is realism. The success of a theory in passing tests
rationally warrants believing that it is closer to the truth than are the-
ories that fail.
The argument I shall construct is a descendant of this line. Lots
of empirical success need no explanation, and lots of it has nonrealist
explanation. Lots of theory is unsuccessful. The problem is to identify
a specific form of success that realism alone explains, and then to show
that this virtue of realism is epistemically justificatory. The form of
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success I propose is novel success; the successful prediction by a theory
of an empirical result that is novel for it.
Intuitively, ‘novel’ means both new, not just temporally but in the
sense of different or unusual, and unexpected. These attributes pose an
explanatory challenge that it will take realism to meet. How does a the-
ory manage to predict unusual and unexpected results correctly? That
its predictions are correct is a matter of experience. The answer to the
question why they are correct is that this is the way the world is found
to be. That they are its predictions is a matter of deduction. The theory
yields its predictions because of the inferential resources of its semantic
content. Realism is not involved in answering these questions, but the
question I have posed does not reduce to these. It is a second-order ques-
tion about the success of the theory. That it be just the correct results
that the theory predicts is not, if these results are novel, explained by
the fact that the theory sustains certain logical relations to certain ob-
servation sentences which simply happen to be correct. The explanation
must appeal to some property of the theory, something distinctive in
its content that enables it reliably to forecast the unfamiliar and unex-
pected. Unless this content is interpreted realistically, the theory’s novel
success appears purely accidental.
Let me be more precise about novelty to make clear why realism is
required to explain the novel success of theories. Classic examples of
novelty are the prediction from general relativity of the gravitational
deflection of starlight, and the prediction from Fresnel’s transverse wave
theory of light of the bright spot in the center of the shadow cast by a
circular disk in spherical diffraction. These results were new, unknown,
surprising, unanticipated independently of the theory predicting them,
uninvolved in constructing this theory, and unlike results supporting rival
theories. They present all of the features intuitively associated with
novelty. But some of these features do not require realism and some
need not be present for realism to be required. A result could be new
and unknown, yet instantiate a general law presupposed in constructing
the theory that predicts it. Then the success of the prediction gives
no epistemic support to the theory. A result could be well known yet
unexplained, even contrary to the predictions of extant theories. Then
its prediction by a new theory carries probative weight. The use of a
result in constructing a theory might have been inessential, such that the
theory would have predicted the result without its use. Even a theory
expressly motivated by the need to explain a result can receive epistemic
credit for doing so, if the result is not involved in its construction. The
core conditions for an analysis of novelty are those under which novel
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predictive success depends on the existence of the mechanisms theorized
to produce it and the accuracy of their description.
Two such conditions will be jointly sufficient for the prediction of a
result R by a theory T to be novel for T . The more basic intuitively is
independence: R must not instantiate any general law used essentially in
constructing T . This captures the idea that R was not built-in, whether
expressly or inadvertently, such that T would automatically have pre-
dicted R whether T is true or not. Secondly, the prediction must be
unique: no viable rival of T provides an alternative basis for predicting
R. For otherwise, R′s evidential status is ambiguous. The uniqueness
condition speaks to the intuition that a novel consequence of T must
differ from the empirical consequences of other theories.
Classic examples of novelty exhibit these conditions. Young’s law
of interference could be used to obtain the positions and intensities of
diffraction bands, but not Fresnel’s predictions for spherical diffraction.
And certainly no corpuscular theory of light could be made to yield the
unexpected bright spot. A gravitational influence on light could be based
on Newtonian theory, but only by suspending major theoretical develop-
ments since Newton: the incorporation of the wave theory of light into
electromagnetic field theory, and the role of light in relativistic mechan-
ics. No viable rival to Einstein’s analysis of deflection was available.
My explanationist argument for realism is now straightforward. A
theory’s sustained record of novel predictive success is only explainable
by supposing that the theory has correctly identified and described the
entities or processes responsible for the observations predicted. The re-
alist explanation of the theory’s success is then epistemically unrivaled.
If this success is uncompromised by failure, if the theory is free of dis-
confirming results and conceptual problems, then the realist explanation
of its success is also epistemically undefeated. But an explanation that
is neither rivaled nor defeated is epistemically justified, on pain of skep-
ticism with respect to ordinary beliefs whose provenance in unavoidably
abductive.
6 Consequences and clarifications
Independence is a historical attribute; whether R satisfies the indepen-
dence condition depends on how T was developed. If we imagine T
having alternative provenances without overlapping reliance on common
results, or generalizations of them, then all of T ′s predictions satisfy in-
dependence, for the use of none is essential to T ′s construction. This is
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appropriate, for alternative provenances constitute a form of overdeter-
mination, which should be as much of an epistemic advantage as under-
determination is an epistemic liability. A theory’s provenance provides
reasons for thinking it plausible and taking it seriously as a potentially
acceptable account of some domain of nature, pending empirical testing6.
Additional provenances represent additional grounding.
But of course predictions novel for T do not automatically support
T . They must be established by observation with quantitative accuracy.
A theory rich in novel consequences is rich in opportunities for epistemic
support, none of which might materialize. Independent provenances are
rare historically, and even if present are no guarantee that T merits
realist interpretation.
Although novel for T , R might come to be explained or predicted by
a rival T ′ of T that is developed after the fact. Rather than preempt the
novelty of R, the effect of the advent of T ′ is to challenge the epistemic
weight ofR . The uniqueness condition is to be read as temporally in-
dexed; it is not novel status that varies with historical developments but
its epistemic significance. This interpretation accords with philosophical
as well as scientific practice. The antirealist wishes to credit superseded
theories with empirical success. The most important form of empirical
success is novel success, and it must be possible to diagnose such success
however further developments affect T .
However, T ′ does not necessarily undermine the support of R for
T . If R would not have been novel for T ′ even if T were unavailable—
if, for example, T ′ is expressly designed to yield R and provides no
independent theoretical basis for explaining R—then T is still favored.
For the correctness of T ’s explanation of R is still undefeated as an
explanation of T ′’s ability to predict R successfully.
What if, but for T , R would have been novel for T ′? What if T ′
only happens to come later; its provenance owes nothing to T or R,
and its prediction of R is epistemically as impressive as T ′s? Then,
of course, R′s support of T is undermined; R is no longer a reason to
interpret T realistically. And if such sequences are historically common,
the antirealist has a new basis for skeptical induction.
Accordingly, realism predicts that such scenarios will not occur. It
predicts that viable rivals to epistemically warranted theories will not
arise. It predicts that theories that record novel success will continue to
6Confusion of the rational provenance of a theory with its subsequent empiri-
cal confirmation has misled some authors (e.g., Philip Kitcher [Kitcher 2001]) into
supposing that the kind of argument I am constructing begs the question against
antirealism.
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be successful, that the existence and properties of the theoretical enti-
ties they invoke to explain novel results will be upheld through further
developments in science. As novel success is realism’s standard of epis-
temic warrant, realism, if it is to be warranted, must itself meet this
standard. The importance of the predictions in question is to deliver on
this requirement.
No philosophical rival to realism provides a basis for these predictions,
nor are they involved in the argument for or content of the realist thesis.
Accordingly, they satisfy the independence and uniqueness conditions for
novelty. Realism is self-referentially consistent, as any naturalistically
defensible theory must be.
Scenarios that defeat realism leave us without an explanation of T ′s
ability to predict R successfully. We must allow that some novel success
may simply be chance. And of some novel success, the correct explana-
tion may not be epistemically warrantable by us. But these possibilities
do not prevent realism from being warranted where the explanation it
offers is undefeated. Rather, they register the unavoidable defeasibility
of realism and suggest that realism be embraced only where a substantial
record of sustained novel success has been achieved. As a philosophical
interpretation of the epistemic status of T , realism requires retrospec-
tive evaluation of the evidential situation; we should not expect to read
realism off of scientific practice in real time.
7 The importance of novelty
I have rebuked antirealism for insensitivity to differences in the status
of theoretical entities. The positive argument I have constructed for
realism reveals a related failing. Antirealism lacks the resources to dis-
tinguish novel predictive and explanatory success from a theory’s routine
empirical applications. There is no question that novel applications are
especially compelling epistemically. From the use of Newtonian theory
to discover outer planets of the Solar System, to Mendel’s backcross test
of the genetic hypothesis, to the application of atomic theory to Brow-
nian motion, to the bright spot discovered in spherical diffraction, to
the conversion of matter and energy, to the gravitational deflection of
starlight, novel results have provided a warrant for theories that mere
conformity to observation cannot signify.
To account for this difference requires treating not just the observ-
able results themselves, but a theory’s success in predicting them, as a
proper object of explanation. Where, but only where, the results are
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novel, the explanation of their successful prediction must be that the
theory has correctly identified and described the theoretical mechanisms
of their production. To treat all theoretical entities with agnostic in-
difference preempts this explanation. Antirealism may acknowledge the
possibility that a theory has posited the right entities. But in insisting
that this possibility be epistemically inaccessible, antirealism in effect
reduces the theory to a mere predictive instrument: a theory’s only per-
missible endorsement is that it is, unaccountably, a good predictor. And
with respect to this attribute, all observable phenomena, from novel dis-
coveries to programmed outcomes, are epistemically on a par. All of a
theory’s observed consequences are equal confirmation of its predictive
accuracy.
The concept of novelty gives realism a criterion for epistemic com-
mitment; it identifies the conditions under which theoretical belief is
warranted. This criterion undercuts the holistic conception of confirma-
tion, which is as unacceptably indiscriminate as antirealism’s dismissal
of all theoretical entities. The portions of a theory that are to be in-
terpreted realistically and expected to survive future changes in theory
are those responsible for the theory’s novel success. The realist does not
presuppose the correctness of current theory in allocating epistemic com-
mitments to past theory. He identifies what was novel in the successes
of past theories and determines how that novel success was achieved.
His criterion of epistemic commitment is the same for past science as for
present.
Nor does the realist presuppose the legitimacy of whatever inference
is needed to close the logical gap between theory and evidence. He en-
dorses a specific ampliative move to support a theory with novel success
over its algorithmically generated rivals. I argued that T ′s rivals are not
confirmable, while, by hypothesis, T is. The basis for the hypothesis
was simply that ampliative inference as such may not be disallowed on
pain of skepticism. Allowing ampliation as such is enough to make T a
proper object of confirmation, but not T ′s rivals.
The positive argument I have since constructed for realism affords
greater specificity. The ampliative principle that warrants interpreting T
realistically is an abductive inference from T ′s novel success. No algorith-
mically generated rival to T can possibly claim novel success. The rivals
cannot make novel predictions at all, because their observational con-
sequences violate both requirements for novelty. All their consequences
are already consequences of T , which violates uniqueness. And all their
consequences are used essentially in their construction; their semantic
content is determined by specifying what their consequences are to be.
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This violates independence. It follows from my positive argument for
realism that the rivals are ineligible for epistemic support. Their avail-
ability cannot, therefore, establish the underdetermination of T . This
reasoning presupposes nothing more than the rejection of a sweeping
skepticism that would deprive ordinary, paradigmatically unproblematic
beliefs of their necessary grounding in explanatory inference.
8 Observation and theory
To this point I have assumed a clear and absolute distinction between
observational and theoretical propositions. Observational propositions
formulate the evidence by which theories are judged, and the question
has been whether this evidence is ever, in principle, sufficient for epis-
temic commitment to theories. The distinction is necessary to engage
the antirealist, for without it antirealism collapses into skepticism. An-
tirealism requires an observational level exempt from problems of un-
derdetermination and historical inconstancy to circumscribe its range of
incredulity.
Realism, by contrast, makes no such requirement. Although tradi-
tionally formulated within the problematic of vouchsafing the inference
from observation to theory, realism’s essential message is that epistemic
justification is not confined to the observable. Realism does not require
that there even be an essential division of observation from theory; it
requires only that if there is, it does not divide the justifiable from the
unjustifiable. In particular, my own positive argument for realism does
not depend upon the observational status of novel results. Results novel
for a theory are consequences of it that satisfy independence and unique-
ness. Any result, whether classifiable as observational or not, could be
novel, and, if epistemic justification is not restricted to an observational
classification, could be independently established and evidentially pro-
bative.
As antirealism requires an epistemically privileged category of obser-
vational propositions distinguished from theory and realism does not, it
is appropriate to ask whether the requirement can be met. I am inclined
to concede to the antirealist at least a rough-and-ready distinction be-
tween observation and theory; although I think it is more contextual and
variable than he can tolerate, it is not purely conventional, as Popper
would have it. The issue I wish to press is that of epistemic privilege;
could there be justified observational beliefs if no theoretical beliefs are
justifiable?
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Popper thought not, and in this he anticipated an important argu-
ment against antirealism. He recognized that the certification of protocol
sentences has theoretical presuppositions. Observation reports are falli-
ble, and often they are corrected or reinterpreted in ways that affect their
evidential bearing on theory. In order to trust them as evidence, there
must be reason to believe that conditions are not such as to undermine
their reliability. But beliefs as to the conditions under which observation
is reliable are not themselves classifiable as observational. We observe ob-
jects, not the accuracy of our observation of them. Should it be imagined
that the accuracy of observation is itself somehow an object of observa-
tion, then it would become necessary to ask after the observability of
the accuracy of observations of accuracy. That won’t do. Unobservable
entities and processes can interfere with our ability to represent objects
accurately on the basis of observing them. We use theories about the
nature of observation and the impediments to its veridicality in assessing
the correctness and the evidential weight of observation reports. Only
if these theories are justified are we entitled to our discrimination of
trustworthy from untrustworthy reports.
Antirealism assumes a rigidly foundationalist picture of the struc-
ture of epistemic justification. There is a privileged class of judgments
sanctioned by observation whose justification is unproblematic and au-
tomatic. This class must be identifiable independently of any theorizing,
for it is assumed that its members are the common explananda of rival
theories. Propositions outside this class are justifiable, if at all, only in-
directly by inference from those inside. The more remote a proposition’s
content from paradigmatically observable situations, the more dubious
its epistemic status.
Given this foundationalist picture, doubts as to the existence of such
a privileged class of propositions with the required properties are im-
mediately skeptical doubts. If observation is fallible, if observational
judgments may themselves be objects of justification, if their evaluation
invokes judgments outside their class, then the entire structure of justi-
fication collapses. The antirealist wants to be a skeptic only at the level
of theory. But his epistemology makes this restriction untenable. For
his arguments against theory can be repeated at the level of evidential
reports used to judge theory. Such reports are revised, reinterpreted,
and underdetermined by experience. In view of these liabilities, the con-
sistent foundationalist can only retreat to a yet more basic epistemic
level.
If there is such a level, then with respect to it the antirealist’s ar-
guments fail. There will be a foundation for belief not itself in need of
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epistemic support but capable of providing it. The evidential judgments
of science will be justified in terms of it. But if this works for the eviden-
tial judgments of science, why not for the theoretical judgments inferred
in turn? There will be no reason to arrest epistemic assent short of the-
ory. If there is no epistemically basic level, then antirealist arguments
succeed everywhere. There is no place to arrest epistemic descent into a
sweeping skepticism that antirealism eschews.
We are left with two nonskeptical options: repudiate foundationalism
or allow epistemic support to extend throughout the structure of our
belief system. The first option eliminates the antirealist’s grounds for
denying the possibility of theoretical knowledge. On this option, whether
or not a belief is justifiable has no automatic connection to a classification
of beliefs into ontological kinds. The second option provides for the
justification of theoretical beliefs. Their epistemic status may be less
secure than that of beliefs closer to the foundations, but the difference
is at most one of degree. Either way, scientific realism wins.
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